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THE PROFOUND IMPACT OF MILLIKEN v.
BRADLEY
Robert A. Sedlert
INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTION AND METROPOLITAN
DESEGREGATION
Certain constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have a profound impact on American society because they de-
termine the constitutional validity of governmental policies and prac-
tices that directly shape the nature of our society. Brown v. Board of
Education' was such a decision. While Brown itself dealt only with
the constitutionality of state-mandated racial segregation in the pub-
lic schools of seventeen southern and border states, the effect of the
Court's holding in that case was to invalidate all state-imposed racial
segregation and with it the official structure of societal racism that
existed in the southern part of the nation.2 In retrospect then, Brown
was not so much a decision about racial segregation in education as
it was a decision about the meaning of racial equality under the
fourteenth amendment.
In the years following Brown, the Court dealt more specifically
with the nature of the constitutional right of children to attend
schools that were in fact racially integrated. In this context, a ra-
cially integrated school means a school that has a substantial num-
ber of both black and white students in attendance, so that the
school is not racially identifiable with respect to student composi-
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A. 1956, J.D. 1959, University
of Pittsburgh. Ms. Ann Warner, a third-year student at Wayne State University
Law School, provided valuable assistance in analyzing the studies and data dealing
with "white flight" and academic achievement.
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. In a series of per curiam decisions following Brown, the Court invalidated
state-imposed segregation with respect to all public facilities. See, e.g., New Orleans
City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Deteige, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955). In my view, Brown, the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), and the above per curiam decisions, are best explained by the
rationale that state-imposed segregation is necessarily unconstitutional because it
restricts the liberty of blacks and whites to associate with each other in public facili-
ties, and such a restriction is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective. Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegregation: An Inquiry into the
Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 Ky. L.J. 879, 940-44 (1979-1980).
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tion.3 The substantive right that has emerged is not a right to attend
a racially integrated school, but only a right to attend school in a
school system in which there are no vestiges of de jure segregation.
The de jure segregation doctrine has assimilated, for purposes of
constitutional analysis, both the segregation existing in school sys-
tems located in states where segregation was required by state law at
the time of the Brown decision, and the segregation existing in
school systems located in states such as Michigan, where it was not
so required. The key element of the de jure segregation doctrine is
governmental responsibility for the existence of racially identifiable
schools in the system. When such responsibility can be shown-as by
state law mandating racial segregation pre-Brown, or by intention-
ally segregative school board actions contributing to the racially
identifiable character of some schools in the system-the system it-
self is considered to be de jure segregated, and the school authorities
are required to desegregate the entire school system by eliminating
racially identifiable schools to the maximum extent feasible. In the
absence of governmental responsibility, however, the resulting school
segregation is considered to be de facto and is not unconstitutional.4
I have elsewhere criticized the de jure-de facto distinction, and
will not repeat that criticism here.5 Suffice it to say that under the
de jure segregation doctrine, the current right of a child to attend a
racially integrated school depends in large measure on what hap-
pened in the school system in the past. It also depends, as we shall
see, on the current enrollment of a sufficient number of children of
both races in the school system so that the schools in that system can
be effectively integrated. In Michigan, for example, children now en-
rolled in the Lansing and Kalamazoo school systems are attending
racially integrated public schools as a matter of constitutional right
3. For these purposes, a racially identifiable school is one that is attended
only or almost entirely by children of one race so that it would be perceived objec-
tively as a "one race" school. A racially identifiable "black" school is a school that
is attended only by black children or has so few white children in attendance in
relation to black children that it would be perceived objectively as a black school. A
racially identifiable "white" school would exhibit the same attendance pattern in
reverse. Since the overall white population in any metropolitan area will substan-
tially outnumber the overall black population, it takes proportionately fewer blacks
than whites to integrate a particular school. Given the existence of present residen-
tial patterns of extreme racial concentration and segregation in most parts of the
country, the overwhelming majority of schools, in the absence of affirmative inter-
vention, will be racially identifiable schools. This was the situation prevailing in the
Detroit metropolitan area at the time of Milliken v. Bradley, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D
Mich. 1971), affd in part, vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418
U.S. 717 (1974), and this is the situation prevailing in the Detroit metropolitan area
today.
4. See generally Sedler, supra note 2, at 882-915.
5. Id. at 916-26.
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because there was a finding of past intentional segregative actions on
the part of the school authorities, and a resulting judicially imposed
desegregation remedy." But children enrolled in the Grand Rapids
school system do not have such a right since there was no showing
that the Grand Rapids school authorities had engaged in intention-
ally segregative actions in the past.7 And the children enrolled in the
Detroit school system, which is 90% black, are attending racially
identifiable black schools, despite a judicial finding of unconstitu-
tional de jure segregation, simply because there are not nearly
enough white children in that system with which to integrate the
schools.
In Milliken v. Bradley,8 the Supreme Court dealt with the im-
position of a metropolitan desegregation remedy for the Detroit
school system. The Court held that the imposition of a metropolitan
remedy for the de jure segregation found to exist in an urban school
system was not generally permissible. Milliken is enormously signifi-
cant because it effectively insured the continued existence in this
Nation of predominantly black urban school systems surrounded by
all-white, or virtually all-white, suburban school systems. In retro-
spect, Milliken was the case that clearly defined the nature of the
substantive right with respect to school desegregation: it is only the
right to attend school in a school system in which no vestiges of
state-imposed segregation presently exist. As Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, stated:
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents resid-
ing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in the dis-
trict. . . The view of the dissenters, that the existence of a
dual system in Detroit can be made the basis for a decree
requiring cross-district transportation of pupils, cannot be
supported on the grounds that it represents merely the devis-
ing of a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights
already established by our prior decisions. It can be sup-
ported only by drastic expansion of the constitutional right
itself, an expansion without any support in either constitu-
tional principle or precedent.9
In Milliken, both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found
that the desegregation of the Detroit system by a remedy involving
6. NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 997 (1977); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
7. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
8. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd in part, vacated in part, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
9. 418 U.S. at 746-47 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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the cross-transportation between students in Detroit and in the fifty-
three adjacent suburban school systems covered by the desegregation
plan, was fully practicable.10 But since, as Milliken makes clear, the
nature of the substantive right to school desegregation relates to the
situation prevailing in the school system in which the child is en-
rolled, rather than to attendance at a racially integrated school, the
practicability of a metropolitan desegregation plan was irrelevant in
the constitutional equation.
I followed the Milliken litigation with intense interest because
at the time I was lead counsel in a case seeking to impose a similar
metropolitan desegregation remedy for Louisville-Jefferson County,
Kentucky." In the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, the Sixth
Circuit, in reliance on its Milliken decision, also ordered the imposi-
tion of a metropolitan desegregation remedy. The school districts
sought certiorari from that decision to the Supreme Court. When the
Court decided Milliken, it granted the school districts' petition, va-
cated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Milliken. On remand, we successfully dis-
tinguished Milliken and prevailed. The Sixth Circuit reinstated its
prior decision, holding that the imposition of a metropolitan desegre-
gation plan for Louisville and Jefferson Counties was proper. The
Louisville and Jefferson County districts were merged in accordance
with Kentucky law, and a metropolitan desegregation plan that pro-
vided for the desegregation of all the schools in the merged Jefferson
County school district went into effect during the 1975-76 school
year. Today, over ten years later, all of the schools in the Jefferson
County school district remain racially integrated; the black percent-
age of the school district has increased only in accordance with nor-
mal demographic change, and the desegregation plan, while not uni-
versally popular, has been accepted by the community.
The legal arguments used in the Louisville-Jefferson County
case and my views at the time as to how metropolitan desegregation
could sometimes be achieved notwithstanding the strictures of Milli-
ken have been discussed elsewhere, and will not be repeated here.12
10. The dissenters in Milliken emphasized this point. Justice White noted
that the Court majority left "unchallenged the District Court's conclusion that a
plan including the suburbs would be physically easier and more practical and feasi-
ble than a Detroit-only plan." Id. at 767 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice
Marshall pointed out that 17 of the suburban systems included in the plan were
contiguous to Detroit, and the remainder were no more than eight miles outside
Detroit's limits; the maximum one-way travel time under the plan was forty min-
utes. Id. at 813 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
12. See Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On
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Suffice it to say that, following the Milliken decision, efforts to
achieve metropolitan desegregation have not been pursued in De-
trcit, and generally have not been pursued elsewhere.1 3 As Justice
Marshall prophesied in his Milliken dissent, the effect of the deci-
sion would be to "allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided
up each into two cities-one white, the other black."' 4 This is indeed
what has happened, and in Detroit, as in many other metropolitan
areas, we have today overwhelmingly black urban school systems,
surrounded by all-white, or virtually all-white, suburban school
systems.
In looking back at the Milliken decision, removed from my
prior advocacy perspective and, therefore, perhaps with a greater de-
gree of detachment, I would make the following observations. Look-
ing to the line of growth of constitutional doctrine in the area of
school desegregation since Brown, it would not have been inconsis-
tent for the Court in Milliken to have held-as four members were
willing to do-that school district lines could be crossed and a met-
ropolitan desegregation plan imposed in order to remedy effectively
the condition of de jure segregation found to exist in an urban school
district. At the same time, given the premises of the de jure segrega-
tion doctrine as it developed both prior to and subsequent to Milli-
ken, it is probably more consistent with that line of growth for the
Court to have held, as it did in Milliken, that the remedy for a con-
dition of de jure segregation cannot extend beyond the boundaries of
the school district where the constitutional violation occurred.
At the time the Court decided Milliken, the line of growth of
constitutional doctrine in the area of school desegregation involved a
continuing expansion of the duty to eliminate the condition of de
jure segregation and to achieve the actual desegregation of the
schools in the unconstitutional dual school system. In Green v.
County School Board,15 decided in 1968, the Court invalidated the
use of so-called "freedom of choice" plans in states where state law
required segregation pre-Brown, if those plans were not effective to
produce actual desegregation. The following year, in Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education,'6 the Court laid to rest the "all
deliberate speed" formulation, which had delayed full implementa-
tion of desegregation plans in many southern and border states. The
Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975
WASH. U.L.Q. 535.
13. For examples of other cases in which a metropolitan desegregation rem-
edy was ordered following Milliken, see United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Evans v. Buchanan, 393
F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
14. 418 U.S. at 815 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
16. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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next "fork in the road" was reached in 1971 in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,"7 in which the Court held that in
school districts where state law required segregation pre-Brown, geo-
graphic attendance zoning was insufficient to satisfy the school dis-
trict's duty to convert from a dual to a unitary system if such zoning
perpetuated a large number of racially identifiable schools. Swann
thus approved the imposition of a remedy involving extensive student
transportation when this was necessary to achieve the effective de-
segregation of the school system.
The following year the Court held that separate school districts
could not be created from an existing de jure segregated school dis-
trict when the effect of the separation would be to impede one of the
new district's required desegregation."8 And in 1973, the school de-
segregation "moved north." The lower federal courts had been con-
sistently finding the existence of de jure segregation in school dis-
tricts located in states where segregation was not required by state
law pre-Brown. The de jure segregation resulted from the intention-
ally segregative actions on the part of the school authorities that con-
tributed to the racial identifiability of some of the schools in a school
system.19 In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,20 the Court ap-
proved this application of the de jure segregation doctrine. It further
held that proof of segregative intent with respect to part of the
school system created a presumption that the segregated character of
the entire school system was also the result of this segregative intent,
justifying the imposition of a system-wide desegregation remedy.2"
In Milliken, the essential theory of metropolitan desegregation
advanced by the plaintiffs and accepted by the lower courts was that
of state responsibility to remedy unconstitutional de jure segrega-
tion. The plaintiffs argued that it was within the authority of the
federal courts to impose an interdistrict desegregation remedy in the
metropolitan setting when: (1) the urban district was in constitu-
tional violation; (2) the actions of the state contributed to this viola-
tion; and (3) the state had the primary responsibility for public edu-
cation and could exercise significant control over the local school
17. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
18. United States v. Scotland Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
19. See the discussion and review of cases in Sedler, supra note 2, at 896-99;
Sedler, supra note 12, at 545-46.
20. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
21. See the discussion of Keyes in Sedler, supra note 2, at 899-904; Sedler,
supra note 12, at 546-47. The Court subsequently justified the imposition of system-
wide desegregation in these circumstances on the basis of the school board's contin-
uing violation of its affirmative duty to eliminate the de jure character of the school
system. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Sedler, supra note 2, at 904-15.
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districts. The necessity for such a remedy was premised on the dis-
trict court's finding, which was not disputed in Milliken, that a rem-
edy limited to the urban district alone would be inadequate to
achieve meaningful and lasting desegregation within that district.
The Sixth Circuit had no difficulty in accepting this argument,22 and
it would not have been a "leap of faith" for the Supreme Court to
have accepted it as well. If the Court had done so, it would have
merely continued the development of the line of growth of constitu-
tional doctrine in the area of school desegregation in the direction of
the extension of the duty to desegregate. That duty would have been
extended to the state and would have included the duty to desegre-
gate across school district lines when effective desegregation could
not be achieved within the boundaries of the district where the con-
stitutional violation occurred.
However, as stated previously, the essential premise of the de
jure segregation doctrine is that there is governmental responsibility
for the existence of racially identifiable schools in the school sys-
tem.23 Regardless of whether the Court focused on the actions of the
school authorities or on the actions of the state, in Milliken those
actions were shown to have contributed to the existence of racially
identifiable schools only within the boundaries of the Detroit school
district. Thus, as the Court stated, since "[d]isparate treatment of
white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system
...the remedy must be limited to that system. 24 For the Court in
Milliken to have approved the imposition of a metropolitan desegre-
gation remedy when the constitutional violation occurred only within
the boundaries of the Detroit school district-based on the state's
22. The court of appeals stated:
Thus, the record establishes that the State has committed de jure acts of
segregation and that the State controls the instrumentalities whose action
is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of the State acts. There can be
little doubt that a federal court has both the power and the duty to effect a
feasible desegregation plan. . . In the instant case the only feasible de-
segregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the
Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the lim-
ited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan. The power to
disregard such artificial barriers is all the more clear where, as here, the
State has been guilty of discrimination which had the effect of creating
and maintaining racial segregation along school district lines. .
We reject the contention that school district lines are sacrosanct and
that the jurisdiction of the District Court to grant equitable relief in the
present case is limited to the geographical boundaries of Detroit. We reit-
erate that school districts and school boards are instrumentalities of the
State.
484 F.2d at 249-50 (citations omitted).
23. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 882-915.
24. 418 U.S. at 746 (citation omitted).
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responsibility for public education generally-would have been to
undercut the essential premise of the de jure segregation doctrine.
Given the Court's adherence to the de jure segregation doctrine, the
result the Court reached should not be surprising in retrospect. Simi-
larly, the Court's refusal to extend the line of growth of constitu-
tional doctrine in the area of school desegregation to authorize the
imposition of a metropolitan desegregation remedy for the de jure
segregation found to exist only in the urban school district should
also come as no surprise.
The result in Milliken perhaps reflects the Court's ultimate res-
olution of a more fundamental constitutional question: should the
Constitution be interpreted to require the state to operate racially
integrated schools, to the maximum extent feasible, without regard
to a showing of de jure segregation. Despite extensive criticism of
the de jure segregation doctrine, both within and without the Court,
and by those who favor constitutionally required school desegrega-
tion and those who do not,25 the Court has continued to adhere to
this doctrine. It thus has made the right of children to attend a ra-
cially integrated school constitutionally dependent on a showing of
governmental responsibility, often in the distant past, for the exis-
tence of racially identifiable schools in the school system where the
child is enrolled. This means that there is no constitutional obliga-
tion on the state to bring about the operation of racially integrated
schools within a school district, let alone on a metropolitan basis.
At the time the Court decided Milliken, it was usually possible
to establish the existence of de jure segregation in urban school dis-
tricts, both in states where state law required segregation pre-Brown
and in states where it was not so required. In school districts located
in states where segregation was required by state law pre-Brown,
such as Louisville, the state law mandating the operation of schools
on a racially segregated basis satisfied the element of de jure segre-
gation. Since Swann held that geographic zoning was insufficient to
satisfy the school board's duty to establish a unitary school system if
the result of such zoning was to retain a large number of racially
identifiable schools, it followed that the existence of a number of
pre-Brown racially identifiable schools rendered the school system a
dual school system for constitutional purposes. In the Louisville
school district, for example, when we filed the desegregation suit in
1972, fifty-six of the sixty-five schools in the district were pre-Brown
schools, and thirty-five of them had never changed their racial com-
position." This pattern of extant pre-Brown schools that had never
25. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 921-26.
26. Of the remaining 21 schools, 13 were pre-Brown white schools, located in
close proximity to pre-Brown black schools and designed to serve whites residing in
the neighborhood. Eventually, these schools became racially identifiable black
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changed their racial composition was prevalent in all urban school
systems in states where segregation was required by state law pre-
Brown, so all of these systems would be deemed to be de jure
segregated.
In school districts located in states where segregation was not
required by state law pre-Brown, the element of de jure segregation
was satisfied by showing that the school district engaged in inten-
tionally segregative acts, often only with respect to a few schools and
sometimes occurring in the distant past, which contributed to the
racial identifiability of those schools. In case after case, the lower
federal courts found that such acts had occurred, rendering the
school districts segregated for constitutional purposes. 27 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Keyes, upholding a finding of de jure seg-
regation on this basis, made it clear that school segregation had be-
come a national problem, and that if desegregation was to be
ordered by the courts, it would be desegregation throughout the
Nation.
I thus explained the "legal posture" of the Milliken case as
follows:
With the decision in Keyes, school desegregation has
clearly become a national problem, as has the question of
metropolitan desegregation. No longer is it difficult to prove
that urban school districts, wherever located, are in constitu-
tional violation if they have a high degree of racial segrega-
tion. In states in which racial segregation was formerly re-
quired by law, segregation is found to be a vestige of state-
imposed segregation under Swann, and in other states segre-
gation is found to result from segregative intent under Keyes.
If metropolitan desegregation were to be required, it would
certainly be required on a nationwide basis. This was the
next fork in the road, the one reached in Milliken v.
Bradley.28
Perhaps reflecting my frustration and disappointment with the Mil-
liken decision, I further concluded that in Milliken
schools as the black population expanded into these areas.
27. See the discussion of proof of a policy of segregation and a review of the
cases in Sedler, supra note 12, at 545-47. Frequently, these acts occurred in areas
undergoing residential racial transition, and they were done for the purpose of
preventing "white flight" from the school system. They would have had only a mar-
ginal effect on the overall racial segregation existing in the school system. For a
trenchant criticism of the district court's findings of de jure segregation in Detroit in
Milliken, see E. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION
CASE 159-207 (1981).
28. Sedler, supra note 12, at 547-48.
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[t]he Court had come to another "fork in the road," but for
the first time it chose the road that led away from desegrega-
tion and away from equal educational opportunities for black
children. In the wake of Milliken, interdistrict relief and
metropolitan desegregation would not become the conven-
tional remedy for eliminating state-imposed segregation in
urban school districts. A big battle had indeed been lost.29
Looking at Milliken from a current perspective, it is clear that
the Court made the decision not to interpret the Constitution to re-
quire the states to operate racially desegregated schools to the maxi-
mum extent feasible. If the Court had accepted the theory of metro-
politan desegregation advanced by the plaintiffs in that case, and if
it had approved the imposition of a metropolitan desegregation rem-
edy in Detroit, metropolitan desegregation would have become the
norm in many of the Nation's metropolitan areas. This is because
frequently it would not have been difficult to prove both the exis-
tence of de jure segregation in the pivotal urban school district, and
that a desegregation remedy limited to the urban school district
alone would not effectively desegregate that district. Since America's
black population is concentrated in the central cities of the Nation's
major metropolitan areas, and since, as will be pointed out subse-
quently, metropolitan desegregation is not likely to produce substan-
tial "white flight" from the public schools, the approval of the impo-
sition of a metropolitan desegregation remedy in Milliken would
have resulted in a great deal of actual school desegregation through-
out the United States.
This was not to be, and as Justice Marshall prophesied in his
dissent, the effect of the Milliken decision has been to divide many
of America's metropolitan areas into predominantly black urban
school systems surrounded by all-white, or virtually all-white, subur-
ban school systems. As a result, today large numbers of both black
and white children are respectively attending racially identifiable
black schools in adjacent predominantly black urban systems, and
racially identifiable white schools in virtually all-white suburban sys-
tems."0 To say the least, the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken
has had a most profound impact on American society.
29. Id. at 570-71.
30. Detroit Free Press, July 28, 1987, at 3A, col. 1.
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THE IMPACT OF MILLIKEN ON DETROIT: THE DETROIT PUBLIC
SCHOOLS TODAY
In the absence of affirmative intervention to bring about the op-
eration of racially integrated public schools, either within a school
district, or in a metropolitan area by crossing existing school district
lines, the overwhelming majority of public schools in the United
States would be racially identifiable with respect to student composi-
tion. This is due to the patterns of extreme racial residential segrega-
tion and concentration that have long existed virtually everywhere in
this Nation. Because of these patterns of extreme racial residential
segregation and concentration, school districts organized along geo-
graphical lines will often be predominantly white or predominantly
black; and within a school district, the use of geographic attendance
zoning, without more, will produce a large number of racially identi-
fiable schools.
In the states where state law required school segregation pre-
Brown, such state-required school segregation was superimposed on
existing racial residential patterns and may have contributed, in
some degree, to the continuation of those patterns after state-re-
quired school segregation was declared unconstitutional. But, even in
the absence of state-required school segregation, most public schools
would still have been racially identifiable, just as they were in states
where segregation was not required by state law.3' In the school dis-
tricts located in the latter states, school authorities would often build
on existing patterns of racial residential 'segregation to maximize
school segregation and to perpetuate racially identifiable schools.
However, in those districts, such intentionally segregative actions
would only occur in a relatively small portion of the school system,
primarily in areas undergoing racial residential transition and areas
in which blacks and whites lived in fairly close proximity. Even if
those actions had not taken place, most of the schools in the system
would still be racially identifiable. Conversely, if it were not for pat-
terns of racial residential segregation, there would be nothing that
the school authorities could do, short of the most blatant racial ger-
rymandering, to establish racially identifiable schools. And if it were
not for patterns of racial residential concentration, with blacks con-
centrated in the central cities of the nation's metropolitan areas, and
the adjacent suburbs being all-white or virtually so, there would not
31. The likelihood of a particular school being racially identifiable with re-
spect to student composition would depend in large measure on the geographical
area covered by the school's attendance zone. The racial identifiability of the
schools within a system would be greatest at the elementary school level and least at
the high school level. Racial identifiability could be maximized by establishing
schools with relatively small capacities and, as a result, with relatively small attend-
ance zones.
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be predominantly black urban districts surrounded by virtually all-
white suburban districts. It cannot be seriously disputed, therefore,
that the pattern of racial residential concentration and segregation,
interacting with the existence of geographically separate school dis-
tricts and the use of geographic attendance zoning to assign students
within a school district, has always been the primary cause of the
racial segregation that has existed in the public schools throughout
the United States. 2
The extent of racial residential concentration and segregation in
the United States today is simply staggering. The black population is
concentrated within the central cities of the Nation's largest metro-
politan areas, where they generally live in racial isolation from both
urban and suburban whites. A recent study on racial residential con-
centration and segregation, based on 1980 census data, concluded
that "[iun areas which have large black populations, there are many
central city neighborhoods and a few in the suburbs which are either
all-black or well along to becoming exclusively black enclaves. Most
other neighborhoods have no more than token black populations. 33
The extent of racial concentration and segregation can be measured
by the index of dissimilarity. According to that index, if there were
perfect residential racial integration, the index would be 0; if there
were complete residential racial segregation, it would be 100. Ac-
cording to 1980 census data, the index of dissimilarity for the De-
troit metropolitan area was 88. For other metropolitan areas of 2.5
million people or more, the index of dissimilarity was as follows:
New York - 81; Los Angeles-Long Beach - 81; Chicago - 88; Phila-
delphia - 79; San Francisco-Oakland - 72; Washington, D.C. - 70;
Dallas-Fort Worth - 79; Houston - 75; Boston - 77; Nassau-Suffolk
(Long Island) - 77.34
Racial residential concentration goes hand in hand with racial
residential segregation, with the black population being concentrated
in the central cities, and the white population being concentrated in
the suburbs. In Michigan, for example, the 1980 census data re-
vealed that of the statewide black population of 1,198,710, a total of
785,123, close to 66% of blacks, resided within the corporate bound-
aries of the City of Detroit. In the suburban cities within the Detroit
metropolitan area, that is, in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Coun-
ties, excluding Detroit, Highland Park, and Hamtramck, blacks
32. See generally Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for
School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164 (1975); Wolf, Northern
School Desegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 63.
33. Farley, Assessing Black Progress: Voting and Citizenship Rights, Resi-
dency and Housing, Education, 13 ECON. OUTLOOK U.S.A. 16, 17 (1986).
34. Id. at 18.
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made up less than 4% of the population.35
The present pattern of racial concentration of blacks in the cen-
tral city and whites in the suburbs has been an ongoing process, re-
sulting in the existence of an overwhelmingly black city school sys-
tem surrounded primarily by a large number of all-white, or
virtually all-white, suburban school systems. In 1950, for example,
the population of the City of Detroit was approximately 1,900,000,
and that population constituted 61% of the population of the metro-
politan area. By 1970, the city population had declined to approxi-
mately 1,500,000, which constituted only 36% of the population of
the metropolitan area. The city population in 1970 consisted of
838,877 whites and 660,428 blacks. Between 1970 and 1980, the
white population of the city dropped drastically to 413,730, while the
black population had increased to 758,939. By 1980, Detroit's popu-
lation declined to less than 30% of the metropolitan area population.
The black public school population, which is always substan-
tially higher than the overall black population,36 likewise showed a
dramatic increase in the Detroit school system. In the 1960-61
school year, when there were 285,512 students in the Detroit school
system, 45.8% were black. By the 1966-67 school year, when the
school population had increased to 297,035, that figure reflected an
increase of approximately 38,000 blacks, and a decrease of approxi-
mately 25,000 whites, leading to a 56.7% black student population.
In the 1970-71 school year, at the time of the Milliken litigation, the
size of the school system remained relatively constant at 289,743
students, but the black population had increased to 63.8%.17 The
current student population in the Detroit school system has fallen to
35. These figures are taken from a review of 1980 census data in connection
with my representation of Coleman S. Young and the Detroit Branch, NAACP as a
amicus curiae in In re Apportionment of State Legislature-1982, 413 Mich. 96, 321
N.W.2d 565, appeal dismissed sub nom. 459 U.S. 900 (1982). The largest concen-
tration of blacks outside of Detroit was in Flint, which had a 1980 population of
66,124 blacks and 89,647 whites. The next largest concentration of blacks was in
Grand Rapids, which had a population of 28,602 blacks and 147,171 whites. In the
tri-county area, outside of Detroit, Highland Park, and Hamtramck, where the over-
all population was approximately 2.8 million, there were only 10 cities with a black
population of as much as 1000: Pontiac - 28,532; Inkster - 19,994; Southfield -
6976; Ecorse - 5676; Romulus - 4833; River Rouge - 4218; Oak Park - 3814; Mt.
Clemens - 3437; Westland - 2200; Wayne - 1123.
36. This is due primarily to the demographic factor of a substantially higher
fertility rate for black women of childbearing age in comparison to that for white
women of childbearing age. In addition, relatively few black children are enrolled in
private schools.
37. For a discussion of the history of residential racial segregation in the De-
troit metropolitan area and its relationship to school segregation at the time of the
Milliken litigation, see Farley, Population Trends and School Segregation in the
Detroit Metropolitan Area, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 867 (1975).
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approximately 180,000 students, of which approximately 90% are
black.38
The condition of extreme racial residential segregation and con-
centration that exists in the Detroit metropolitan area today, as in
the United States generally, is directly traceable to a long history of
racial discrimination in the "housing delivery system"; the process
by which housing is constructed, sold, financed, and generally made
available. Traditionally, blacks living in metropolitan areas could ob-
tain housing only in the oldest and least desirable parts of the central
city. They could not obtain housing anywhere else because the real
estate industry and the government at all levels determined that the
"housing delivery system" would operate on a racially segregated ba-
sis. Blacks, for example, could not obtain Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) financing to purchase homes in white residential ar-
eas. In fact, until 1949 the FHA required the imposition of a racially
restrictive covenant as a condition for FHA financing of any home.
Public housing operated strictly on a racially segregated basis, with
black public housing located in black neighborhoods, and white pub-
lic housing located in white neighborhoods. The "urban ghetto" ex-
panded as the increasing black population literally pushed blacks
into white residential areas. Whites then moved out, their movement
facilitated by real estate "blockbusting," and the area would be des-
ignated for "black occupancy." Needless to say, most of the metro-
politan area suburban sections were never designated for "black oc-
cupancy."' 39 While efforts have been made to explain the condition of
extreme racial residential segregation and concentration as reflecting
racial income differences and "ethnic choice,"' 40 it cannot be doubted
that the long history of governmental and private racial discrimina-
tion in the operation of the "housing delivery system" played a sig-
nificant part in creating this condition.4'
This condition of extreme racial residential segregation and con-
centration has not and will not be ameliorated to any substantial
38. The figures as to the black school population and the overall city popula-
tion at the time of the Milliken litigation are taken from Judge Roth's opinion in
Milliken. 338 F. Supp. at 585-86. Judge Roth predicted that "if present trends
continue," the Detroit school system would be virtually 100% black by 1992. Id. at
585.
39. For a review of the history of racial discrimination in the housing delivery
system, see Taueber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School Segrega-
tion, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 833, 846-50 (1975).
40. For an explanation of residential racial segregation and concentration in
Detroit on this basis in the context of the Milliken litigation, see E. WOLF, supra
note 27, chs. 1-5.
41. See generally NAT'L ADVIS. COMM'N ON Civ. DISORDERS REP. ch. 6
(1968); U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 29-69
(1974).
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degree by the enactment of fair housing laws. Racial residential pat-
terns, once established, are highly resistant to change. Experience
shows that once blacks move into any residential area in substantial
numbers, a "tipping point" will be reached, and whites will perceive
the area as being "less desirable" because of the substantial presence
of blacks. Even if there is not an immediate exodus of whites, whites
are not likely to move into that area when vacancies occur. These
vacancies are likely to be filled by blacks, and in time the area will
become predominantly black. By the same token, blacks are gener-
ally reluctant to move into all-white areas, so they will move into
areas where there is an existing black population, thereby causing
that area to reach the "tipping point." Few stable racially integrated
residential areas exist and, as a general proposition, blacks and
whites live in isolation from each other. As stated above, it is this
extreme racial residential segregation and concentration that is the
primary cause of school segregation, both within a school system and
between the predominantly black urban system and the all-white or
virtually all-white suburban systems.
The Detroit school system today reflects, perhaps in its most
extreme form, the condition existing in many of the nation's metro-
politan areas. There is an urban school system, consisting primarily
of low and moderate income black children, surrounded by all white
or virtually all-white suburban school systems. It is a matter of com-
mon knowledge that except for the city-wide selective high schools of
Renaissance and Cass Technical, and perhaps a few elementary
schools, middle class black and white parents residing in Detroit will
not utilize the Detroit public schools. Those middle class parents of
both races who choose to live in Detroit have thereby also made the
decision to send their children to private schools. And they do so for
good reason. Not only are the Detroit public schools in the aggregate
academically inferior to the schools in practically all of the other
school systems in the Detroit metropolitan area, but also many of the
Detroit schools are characterized by a high level of social disorgani-
zation. An overriding concern in the Detroit schools today is violence
and students carrying lethal weapons. In such an atmosphere, aca-
demics assume decidedly lesser importance.
The aggregate academic performance of the students in the De-
troit schools is decidedly inferior to the academic performance of
students in Michigan public schools generally. Michigan Educational
Assessment Program (MEAP) results indicate that the reading
scores for Detroit public school students are fifteen to twenty points
below state norms. Those tests measure mastery of basic skills in
reading and mathematics. A passing MEAP score for a school sys-
tem would be for 75% of the students to show mastery over 75% of
the objectives. For the 1985-86 school year, 61.2% of Detroit fourth
graders mastered the reading objectives, compared with a state-wide
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figure, including Detroit, of 79.3%. At the seventh grade level, the
Detroit figure was 59.7%, while the state-wide figure was 80.3%. At
the tenth grade level (by which time a high proportion of Detroit
students have dropped out), the Detroit figure was 65.7%, while the
state-wide figure was 81.9%. In mathematics, the gap was not large
among fourth graders (74.5% for Detroit, compared to 83.6% state-
wide), but was much higher in the later grades. At the seventh grade
level, the figure was 48% for Detroit, compared with 66.2% state-
wide, and at the tenth grade level, it was 49.9% for Detroit, com-
pared with 67.8% statewide.42
The results of the California Achievement Test Scores indicate
that Detroit public school students fall further behind national
norms with increased years of schooling. On the 1986-87 reading
test, Detroit third graders were only three months behind national
norms, while eighth graders were an entire year behind, and eleventh
graders were one year and four months behind. In mathematics,
third graders were at the national norm and fifth graders were only
one month behind, but eighth graders were seven months behind,
and eleventh graders were a full one year and eight months behind.42
The decline in academic performance commensurate to the increased
years of schooling is a factor contributing to the incredibly high
dropout rate of Detroit public school students. The dropout rate for a
cohort of Detroit students moving through four years of high school,
based on data from the 1983-84 academic year, was calculated at
58.8%, compared to 17.6% for students in the remainder of the
state.44
The Detroit school system then is attended primarily by low and
moderate income black students and is characterized by low levels of
academic achievement, a very high dropout rate, and social disor-
ganization in the schools. It is a school system for the black urban
underclass. The same kind of situation, possibly excepting the degree
of social disorganization, exists in a number of other urban school
systems in the United States.
The condition existing in the Detroit Metropolitan area seems
acceptable to the political leadership, both black and white, and to
both middle-class blacks and middle-class whites. Suburban whites
are not disturbed, because their children are attending predomi-
42. The summary of MEAP results is taken from DETROIT HEALTH DEP'T
REP., BUREAU OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE, DETROIT YOUTH: "HARMONIES OF LIBERTY"
OR "DRUNK WITH THE WINE OF THE WORLD?" 11-14 (Feb. 1987). The data deal-
ing with academic achievement were compiled from reports submitted by the Edu-
cation and Testing Department, Detroit Public Schools, and the Michigan Depart-
ment of Education.
43. Id. at 11, 13-14.
44. Id. at 15.
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nantly white and, in many cases, predominantly middle class schools,
which are characterized by high levels of academic achievement, and
are fully insulated from the problems existing in the Detroit schools.
Black political leadership can point to the Detroit school system as a
"black system," in which the superintendent, most of the top admin-
istrators, and a clear majority of the teachers are black. In this
sense, the Detroit school system is a manifestation of "black power."
Middle class blacks and middle class whites living in Detroit are not
personally affected since most of them send their children either to
private schools or to the few "islands of excellence" in the Detroit
school system. Thus, in the final analysis, the Detroit school system
is a "black" school system run by black professionals for mostly
black lower and moderate income children.
But the Detroit school system is not one in which the black chil-
dren who are enrolled in that system thrive. Close to 60% of these
children never graduate from high school. The children that remain
in school generally have significantly lower levels of academic
achievement than students elsewhere in Michigan. And frequently
they attend school in a condition of social disorganization in which
the threat of violence is always present.
WHAT IF MILLIKEN HAD BEEN DECIDED DIFFERENTLY: A TALE
OF Two SCHOOL SYSTEMS
Suppose that in Milliken v. Bradley the Supreme Court had
held that the metropolitan desegregation remedy was proper to elim-
inate the de jure segregation found to exist in the Detroit school sys-
tem, and had ordered that the district court's desegregation plan be
put into effect. Leaving aside the details of implementation-we
may assume for present purposes that there would be a metropolitan
authority overseeing the implementation of the plan-we will posit a
desegregation plan keyed to the then-existing 75-25 white-black per-
centage ratio in the school districts covered by the desegregation or-
der. Under this plan, all of the schools within the covered school
districts would be desegregated according to specified minimum-
maximum racial percentages. In order to minimize the amount of
required transportation at the elementary school level, the spread
would be larger there than at the secondary school level. Because the
white population within the covered school districts is three times
larger than the black population, the minimum-maximum racial per-
centages would be keyed to the black population. Assume the black
enrollment at each secondary school to be between 15% and 30%
and at each elementary school between 10% and 40%. The students
would be assigned to a "home school," the school that they would
attend in the absence of a desegregation plan, and would be bused to
an "assigned" school for a certain number of years. In other words,
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suburban whites would be bused to a school in Detroit, while Detroit
blacks would be bused to a school in the suburbs (suburban blacks
and Detroit whites would not be bused). Since there are three times
more whites than blacks in the covered districts, blacks would have
to be bused more years than whites: blacks would be bused for eight
or nine years, while whites would be bused for two or three years.
In the above discussion, I essentially "carried over" to the De-
troit metropolitan area the desegregation plan that was implemented
in the merged Louisville-Jefferson County district following our suc-
cess on the remand of that case to the Sixth Circuit after Milliken.
The Louisville-Jefferson County desegregation plan went into effect
during the September 1975-76 school year, and with some modifica-
tions, remains in effect today. At the time of the plan's implementa-
tion, the white-black percentage ratio in the merged district was ap-
proximately 80-20. Under the plan, the black enrollment in the
secondary schools was between 14% and 24%, and the black enroll-
ment in the elementary schools was between 12% and 44%. Every
school in the merged district was desegregated in accordance with
these percentage guidelines.45
Those of us who were proponents of metropolitan desegregation
in Louisville-Jefferson County at the time the litigation took place
predicted that implementation of the desegregation plan would have
the following effects: First, the desegregation plan would be stable in
the sense that it would not produce substantial "white flight" from
the merged Jefferson County school system. Second, in the coming
years there would be some improvement in the aggregate academic
achievement level of the black students, without any decrease in the
academic achievement level of the white students. Third, in time, the
desegregation plan would be accepted by the community, and there
would be community commitment to the maintenance of racially in-
tegrated schools.
We maintained that "white flight," which had become a serious
problem at those locations where the desegregation plan was limited
to the urban school district alone, would not be a problem if the
desegregation plan operated on a metropolitan basis. In the first
place, metropolitan desegregation closes off the "public school" es-
cape hatch for white parents wishing to avoid racially integrated
schools. When the desegregation plan is limited to the urban school
district, white parents wishing to avoid racial integration can move
(if they can afford it) to adjacent suburban school districts, and
white parents moving into the metropolitan area with school age
children will move into a suburban school district. Eventually, the
45. The plan was set out and approved by the Sixth Circuit in Cunningham v.
Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1976).
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urban school district becomes "blacker and poorer," as has happened
in Detroit. But, when the desegregation plan covers the entire metro-
politan area, this "escape hatch" is foreclosed. If white parents in
the Louisville area wanted to avoid desegregation but still send their
children to public schools, they would have had to move to the pri-
marily rural adjacent counties in Kentucky or across the river to the
southern Indiana suburbs, where the cost of living and the tax rates
were much higher than in the Louisville area. Few of the white par-
ents chose this alternative. The other alternative would be to enroll
the children in private schools, as most middle class parents, black
and white, who live in Detroit, have done.
This did not happen in Louisville, which brings us to the more
important point in regard to "white flight" and metropolitan deseg-
regation. Metropolitan desegregation significantly reduces the moti-
vation of white parents to send their children to private schools, for
the simple reason that their children will be attending majority white
public schools. Experience indicates that "white flight" is directly
related to the black percentage of the school system and to the pro-
portion of white students who must be reassigned to schools located
in black residential areas. This being so, "white flight" is most pro-
nounced in urban school systems surrounded by accessible white sub-
urbs and is least pronounced in large metropolitan systems sur-
rounded by minimally developed rural areas.46  Thus, in the
Louisville situation, since all of the white children would be attend-
ing majority white schools, we anticipated that "white flight" would
be minimal, and we were proven to be correct.48 A decade after
46. See generally Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegrega-
tion, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 187 (W. Stephen &
J. Feagin eds. 1980); Rossell & Hawley, Understanding White Flight and Doing
Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY
AND FEASIBILITY 157 (W. Hawley ed. 1981); Rossell, School Desegregation and
Community Social Change, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1978).
47. As Professor Rossell-noted:
Metropolitan plans, or countywide plans, all other things being equal, show
less white flight in response to school desegregation than city-only plans.
There are three reasons for this. First, because countywide plans incorpo-
rate suburban areas (where blacks are typically underrepresented), they
have a smaller proportion of students in their school system who are black
than most city school districts. Second, the costs of residential relocation to
a more segregated school district are greater. Third, countywide school dis-
tricts contain the suburban amenities that prompt middle-class
suburbanization in the first place, and thus the "pull" factors stimulating
movement out of the school district do not operate with the same intensity
as in the city school districts.
Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effective-
ness of School Desegregation Plans? 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 89 (1983) (citation
omitted).
48. The "white flight" tlfat did occur was primarily to private schools. See
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desegregation, the overall black population of the Jefferson County
school system stood below 30%, reflecting normal demographic
change.49
This brings us to the relationship between school desegregation
and academic achievement. We predicted that, as a result of deseg-
regation, the aggregate academic achievement level of black children
attending merged school systems would increase, while the academic
achievement level of the white children would remain unaffected.
My experience as a lawyer representing black parents in school de-
segregation cases has left me with no doubt that the primary reason
black parents want their children to attend racially integrated
schools is that the parents are convinced that their children generally
will perform better academically in racially integrated schools than
they would if they were attending racially identifiable black schools.
The data that is available indicates that black parents are correct in
their belief. Black children who are in fact attending racially inte-
grated schools perform better academically-as measured by per-
formance on standardized academic achievement tests-than black
children who are in fact attending racially identifiable black schools.
The data also indicate that attendance at racially integrated schools
in practice does not have an adverse effect on the academic achieve-
ment of white students, although many white parents refuse to be-
lieve this.50
Armor, supra note 46, at 213.
49. Dr. Armor, who strongly maintains that mandatory desegregation is
counterproductive because it produces "white flight," found that there was "white
flight" to private schools in Louisville-Jefferson County during the first two years of
the plan's operation. Armor determined "white flight" by comparing the enrollment
projection with the actual enrollment. According to Armor's data, the actual white
enrollment of the merged Jefferson County system in 1977 was approximately
82,000 students, compared to a projected enrollment of approximately 97,000 stu-
dents, while the private schools gained 11,000 students over projected enrollment for
that year. Id. However, black enrollment in the Jefferson County school system also
declined, indicating a decline in the overall enrollment of the school system due to
demographic factors.
While researchers measure "white flight" in terms of a comparison between the
actual and projected enrollment of white students, the relevant consideration for
purposes of the stability of the desegregation plan is the black-white percentage
ratio of the school system. The Louisville-Jefferson County situation indicates that
in the metropolitan context, in which the area covered by the desegregation order
will be approximately 75% white, the departure of a considerable number of whites,
such as the 11,000 that Armor said left Louisville, will not greatly upset the overall
black-white percentage ratio. This is particularly so since the exodus of white stu-
dents is the heaviest during the first year of desegregation and diminishes over time.
Armor was forced to concede that in the case of metropolitan desegregation, "the
long-term white flight effects . . . may be smaller than for central city districts."
Id.
50. According to Professor Hawley, the following generalizations can be de-
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Sociologists and educators debate the existence of any correla-
tion between racial integration as such and the academic achieve-
ment of black children. Black leaders who question the efficacy of
racial integration in the schools argue that it is "racist" to assume
that black children "need white children around in order to be able
to learn." 51 Academic researchers have argued that it is not possible
to isolate the effect of racial integration from the other factors that
influence the academic achievement of black children. As Professor
Eleanor Wolf noted:
There is little research to demonstrate the effects of various
kinds of classroom composition, uncontaminated by other dif-
ferences, upon the academic performance of children who be-
gin school at various levels of scholastic proficiency. Some of
the busing efforts now in effect should generate such find-
ings, but most attempts to make these programs succeed
have incorporated a variety of educational components in ad-
dition to greater classroom heterogeneity. This mix makes it
difficult or impossible to know the cause of any enhancement
in learning that might be found. 2
rived from the "hundreds of studies of the effects of desegregation on academic
achievement:"
(1) White children's performance on standardized achievement tests al-
most never declines as a result of desegregation.
(2) Minorities benefit academically from desegregation much more often
than they experience negative effects.(3) The earlier minority children experience desegregation, the more likely
desegregation will have positive effects. Most studies with negative out-
comes deal with older students who have only recently experienced
desegregation.
(4) The more carefully and comprehensively a school district prepares for
desegregation, the more likely school desegregation will have positive ef-
fects on achievement. It is interesting to note in this regard that court-
ordered desegregation seems more likely than voluntary desegregation to
result in positive academic outcomes for minorities.
Hawley, Increasing the Effectiveness of Desegregation: Lessons from the Research,
in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 145, 150-51 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman
& C. Schelling eds. 1981).
51. From a personal standpoint, I am reluctant to take too seriously the oppo-
sition of any black leader to racially integrated schools unless that person's own
children are attending racially identifiable black schools.
52. E. WOLF, supra note 27, at 136. Professor Wolf notes that while the opin-
ion of District Judge Roth in Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, did not refer to any
educational harm caused to black children from attendance at racially identifiable
black schools or to any educational benefits that would result from attendance at
racially integrated schools, he was "intensely interested" in the testimony dealing
with the effect of racial integration on the academic achievement of black students.
E. WOLF, supra note 27, at 126. "[Judge Roth's] final remedy order was such a
striking contrast to his expressed pre-trial views on involuntary integration that one
must conclude that this testimony had a profound effect on his thinking." Id.
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Professor Wolf clearly is correct in her assessment. There is no evi-
dence suggesting that the higher achievement level of black children
attending racially integrated schools is due to the racial mixture or
to the presence of white children in the school as such.
Nor is there any logical reason to conclude that there is any
correlation between race and academic achievement. The primary
determinant of academic achievement, as measured by performance
on standardized academic achievement tests, is the social class back-
ground of a child: children coming from economically advantaged
backgrounds in the aggregate will have substantially higher levels of
academic achievement than children coming from economically dis-
advantaged backgrounds. The primary school factor influencing aca-
demic achievement is the social class composition of the school:
schools in which economically advantaged children predominate will
in the aggregate have higher levels of academic achievement than
schools in which economically disadvantaged children predominate.
These conclusions, based on a review of the then available data, were
set forth in the now famous Coleman Report, published in 1966.53
The Coleman Report posited that economically disadvantaged stu-
dents' attendance at schools in which economically advantaged stu-
dents predominated should have a positive effect on the formers' ac-
ademic achievement: their level of academic achievement in the
aggregate would be higher than it would be if the same students
were attending schools in which economically disadvantaged students
predominated, although in the aggregate it would not be as high as
that of the economically advantaged students. 4
Thus, the Coleman Report concluded that the school's social
class composition, rather than its racial composition, was significant
in affecting the academic achievement of black children attending
racially integrated schools:
The apparent beneficial effect of a student body with a high
proportion of white students comes not from racial composi-
tion per se, but from the better educational background and
53. J. COLEMAN. EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). The
study was undertaken by the United States Office of Education in accordance with
directives contained in § 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The conclusions are
effectively summarized in Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 401-03 (1972).
54. It has been contended that this point was only hypothesized in the Cole-
man Report since the data did not measure this effect. See E. WOLF, supra note 27,
at 134-36. Nonetheless, the hypothesis seems very reasonable. The educational at-
mosphere and teacher expectations in a classroom in which advantaged students
predominate frequently may differ from that in a classroom in which disadvantaged
children predominate. An improved educational atmosphere and higher teacher ex-
pectations could be expected to influence positively the academic achievement of
economically disadvantaged children.
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higher educational aspirations that are, on the average found
among white students. The effects of the student body envi-
ronment upon a student's achievement appear to lie in the
educational proficiency possessed by that student body,
whatever its racial or ethnic composition.55
So, if a racially identifiable black school was populated predomi-
nantly by economically advantaged black children, the children at-
tending that school in the aggregate would be expected to have levels
of academic achievement comparable to that of children attending
schools populated predominantly by economically advantaged white
children .56
The problem, of course, is that there are simply not many eco-
nomically advantaged black children in the urban public school sys-
tems. Given the predominant class character of the black population,
resulting from the enormous economic disparities between blacks as
a group and whites as a group, a racially identifiable black school is
likely to be a predominantly economically disadvantaged school as
well. By the same token, when school desegregation is imposed in
accordance with the black-white school population in a metropolitan
area, the great majority of the schools will be predominantly white
and thus predominantly middle class schools.57
55. J. COLEMAN, supra note 53, at 307, 310.
56. A number of the Southfield public schools, including Southfield High
School (which my daughter attends) are now majority black schools. The black pop-
ulation of Southfield is predominantly middle class, and, in fact, according to the
1980 census, black family income in Southfield exceeds white family income. There
has been no decline in the aggregate academic achievement levels of the Southfield
schools that have become majority black schools. Indeed, as the black population of
the Southfield public schools has increased, the aggregate performance of Southfield
students on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program test has increased as
well. In 1977, when the school system was approximately 17% black, the passing
rate for fourth grade students on the MEAP reading tests was 62.2% and on the
MEAP mathematics test was 85.3%. In 1986, when the school system was approxi-
mately 37% black, the passing rate on the reading tests was 95.3% and on the math-
ematics test was 95.3%. On the seventh grade level, the passing rate on the reading
tests had increased from 65.6% in 1977 to 90.3% in 1986, and on the mathematics
tests from 61.9% in 1977 to 85.6% in 1986. On the tenth grade level, the passing
rate on the reading tests had increased from 75.1% in 1979 (the earliest year for
which figures are available) to 88% in 1986, and on the mathematics tests from
62.1% in 1979 to 85.3% in 1986. This data was furnished by the Southfield Public
Schools Superintendent's Office.
57. Depending on how the schools are paired or clustered, some of the schools
(all of which would be majority white) would be predominantly lower-middle class,
some would be predominantly middle-middle class, and some would be predomi-
nantly upper-middle class.
A review of 93 studies dealing with the academic achievement of minority stu-
dents following desegregation led the reviewers to conclude that "the metropolitan
desegregation plans analyzed show stronger achievement effects than other studies."
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In addition, there is the old adage, "Where you can segregate
people, you can discriminate against them." Frequently, within a
school district, the racially identifiable black schools would receive
the "short end of the educational stick" in terms of teacher qualifi-
cations, facilities, and curriculum. And, as is clear in the Detroit
metropolitan area, often the predominantly black urban district has
less available funds per student than the surrounding predominantly
white suburban districts."' Whatever else school integration does, it
forces a sharing of available educational and financial resources be-
tween black and white students.
It should now be clear why black parents are correct in their
belief that attendance at racially integrated schools is likely in the
aggregate to improve the academic achievement levels of their chil-
dren over what they would be if their children were attending ra-
cially identifiable black schools. Schools in which white children
predominate are in fact generally educationally superior to schools
in which black children predominate. So, if black children are at-
tending schools that are also attended by a substantial number of
white children, these black children are likely to perform better aca-
demically than they would if they were attending racially identifi-
able black schools.
The two plausible explanations advanced by the reviewers were that metropolitan
desegregation "represents the most complete form of socioeconomic desegregation,"
and that "suburban school districts, spared the conflict and tension that surround
the operation of many central-city school districts, have been able to recruit stronger
teaching staffs and better principals and provide a more effective administrative
environment for their schools. This latter observation also carries over upon the cre-
ation of a metropolitan district or upon the reassignment of minority students to
suburban schools. Crain & Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy Implications of
Research, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 55, 72-74 (W. Hawley ed. 1981).
58. The Detroit school district has one of the lowest tax bases in relation to
the number of its students in the metropolitan area and in fact in the entire state. In
the 1981-82 school year, the tax base (State Equalized Valuation of Property per
Student, or SEVPP) for Detroit was $23,130, compared with $120,599 for Dear-
born, and $93,970 for Grosse Pointe. During that year, Detroit, which had approxi-
mately the same tax rate as Grosse Pointe and a lower tax rate than Dearborn, had
$2214 per student, compared with $3179 per student for Dearborn, and $3287 per
student for Grosse Pointe. Of 39 Wayne County school districts that year, Detroit
ranked 32nd in terms of funds available for the education of each student. The
disparities have not been reduced in succeeding years.
In the 1985-86 school year, for example, Detroit had $3168 per student, com-
pared with $4137 per student for Dearborn, and $4982 per student for Grosse
Pointe. In Detroit, the average teacher earned $30,795 and had 24 pupils. In Dear-
born, the average teacher earned $33,860 and had 18 pupils. In Grosse Pointe, the
average teacher earned $37,090 and had 19 pupils. And in Southfield, where the
aggregate performance of the students on the Michigan Educational Assessment
Program has increased as the black population of the school system has increased,
the average teacher earned $36,511 and had 17 students. See Layoffs Began in
School Strike, Detroit Free Press, Sept. 2, 1987, at I.
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In a comprehensive review of the various studies of the aca-
demic achievement of black children attending racially integrated
schools, Crain and Mahard arrived at the following "real world"
conclusion:
All else being equal, will the mixing of races alone result in
higher black achievement? That question cannot be an-
swered, because in the real world desegregation is never an
"all else being equal" situation. Desegregation sometimes re-
sults in better curricula or facilities; it often results in blacks
having better trained or more cognitively skilled teachers; it
is frequently accompanied by a major effort to upgrade the
quality of education; and it almost always results in socioeco-
nomic desegregation. When desegregation is accompanied by
all of these factors, it should not be surprising that there are
immediate achievement gains half to two-thirds of the time.59
In the "real world" then, attendance at racially integrated schools
has a positive effect on the aggregate academic achievement of black
children. This is why, in my experience, most black parents, if given
a choice, would rather have their children attending racially inte-
grated schools than racially identifiable black schools. The aggregate
academic achievement level of black children attending racially inte-
grated schools will not be nearly as high as the aggregate academic
achievement level of white children attending those schools-given
the difference in the predominant class composition of the black and
white populations-but it is likely to be significantly higher than it
59. Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of
the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 49 (1978). In a subsequent analysis
of these and other studies, the authors noted that two main findings consistently
appear in all the studies: (1) "minority students in predominantly Anglo schools
score higher on achievement tests;" and (2) "this does not seem to be because of the
'whiteness' of the school but because predominantly white schools have student bod-
ies with the highest socioeconomic status." Id. at 56. The authors also found that
"the beneficial effects of desegregation take place during the very earliest primary
school grades," so that students desegregated after that time "inadequately
represent the true effects of desegregation." Id. at 61. There is also a correlation
between the white-black percentage of the school and black academic achievement.
There must be a "critical mass" of black students in the school: the academic
achievement level of black students was lowest in the schools with the smallest black
population. When the black percentage is too low, black students may perceive the
school environment as being hostile to blacks. On the other hand, once that "critical
mass" is present, the academic achievement of black students is directly related to
the percentage of white students in the school-the greater the number of white
students, the higher the academic achievement of the black students. These results
show why the academic achievement of black students is maximized by metropoli-
tan desegregation. "It is only with metropolitan desegregation that one can be guar-
anteed a large enough population of white students to provide for predominantly
(but not overwhelmingly) white student bodies." Id. at 74-76.
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would be if those same black children were attending racially identi-
fiable black schools. 60
As we predicted, this is what happened in Louisville. Not only
did the academic achievement scores of black students improve in
relation to those of white students, but the academic achievement
scores of both black and white students improved in relation to na-
tional norms. The improved academic achievement of black students,
as would be expected, was greatest at the elementary level, since
these children were starting their educational experience in desegre-
gated schools.6 For example, from 1975 to 1977, the reading level of
black second graders improved from the twenty-fifth to the thirty-
fourth percentile, while the reading level of white second graders im-
60. The numerous studies of the relationship between desegregation and the
academic achievement of black students do not always focus on this point of com-
parison. Many studies look for a reduction in the aggregate academic achievement
gap between black and white students, and when this reduction is not shown to
exist, conclude that desegregation does not improve the academic achievement of
black students. Perhaps the reason for the disagreement among the researchers is
that they are trying to measure different things. For a summary of the different
studies commissioned by the National Institute of Education, see Ascik, An Investi-
gation of School Desegregation and Its Effects on Black Student Achievement, AM.
EDuC., Dec. 1984, at 15.
Perhaps the more relevant inquiry, which some researchers are now making,
concerns the optimum setting for maximizing the academic achievement of black
children and the effectiveness of school desegregation. See Hawley, supra note 50,
at 145. Professor Hawley contends that the following policies will establish this opti-
mum setting:
[1] Assign students so that schools and classrooms are neither
predominantly white nor predominantly black. ...
[2] Assign to each classroom a sizable number of students who per-
form at or above grade level. ...
[3] Encourage substantial interaction among races both in academic
settings and extracurricular activities. ...
[4] Eschew academic competition, rigid forms of tracking, and abil-
ity grouping that draws attention to individual and group achievement dif-
ferences correlated with race. ...
[51 Recruit and retrain teachers who are relatively unprejudiced,
supportive, and insistent on high performance and racial equality. ...
[6] Recruit and retrain principals who are supportive of desegrega-
tion and exert leadership in that direction. ...
[7] Involve parents at the classroom level in actual instructional or
learning activities. ...
[8] Initiate programs of staff development that emphasize the
problems relating to successful desegregation. . ..
[9] Maintain a relatively stable student body over time. ..
[10] Desegregate students early, in kindergarten if possible.
Id. at 154-57 (italics omitted).
61. Recall that in the Detroit school system, the educational gap between De-
troit students, both in relation to other Michigan students and in relation to national
norms, increases with the number of years of school the students have attained.
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proved from the forty-fifth to the forty-seventh percentile, resulting
in a nine point gain in absolute terms and a thirteen point gain in
relation to whites. Black third graders rose from the thirtieth to the
fortieth percentile, while white third graders rose from the fifty-
fourth to fifty-eighth percentile, while white third graders rose from
the fifty-fourth to fifty-eighth, leading to a ten point gain in absolute
terms and a six point percentile gain in relation to whites. In the
fifth grade, black students went from the twenty-fifth to the thirty-
sixth percentile, while white students improved from the fiftieth to
the fifty-fourth percentile, an eleven point gain in absolute terms and
a seven point gain in relation to whites.62 One of the most positive
outcomes of metropolitan desegregation in the Louisville area then
has been the improved academic achievement levels of black chil-
dren, and the improved academic achievement levels of both black
and white children in relation to national norms.
Our third prediction, that in time there would be community
acceptance of the desegregation plan, ties in with the improved aca-
demic achievement of both black and white students following the
implementation of the desegregation plan. For many reasons, includ-
ing the proportionate availability of resources, the Kentucky educa-
tional system lagged behind that of other states such as Michigan.
This fact was reflected in the academic achievement scores of Ken-
tucky students in relation to national norms. Yet, once desegregation
became a reality in Louisville-Jefferson County and the available re-
sources were shared equally between black and white students, there
was a commitment to "making the system work" in that school dis-
trict. The resulting educational advantages have been enjoyed by all
the students and are reflected in higher academic achievement
scores. In 1976, for example, not one of the twelve grades scored
above the fiftieth percentile in reading on national standardized
tests. Only two grades reached that level in mathematics. By 1981,
all grades except one, eleven, and twelve were above the fiftieth per-
centile in reading. Eight grades were above that level in mathemat-
ics.63 As one school administrator put it: "The more years there has
been desegregation in the school system, the more improvement
there has been in the scores." '64
Today, the desegregation plan remains in effect, and the com-
62. The data are taken from KY. COMM'N ON Civ. RTs. REP., SCHOOL AND
HOUSING DESEGREGATION ARE WORKING TOGETHER IN LOUISVILLE AND JEFFER-
SON COUNTY: 1975-1983 (June 1983). For a discussion of improved academic
achievement in the merged Louisville-Jefferson County system, see Study Discerns
Educational Benefit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1981, at A 16, col. 1; Test Score Trends:
Blacks Gain, Whites Hold Steady, Louisville Times, May 13, 1980.
63. Ky. COMM'N ON Civ. RTs. REP., supra note 62.
64. Id.
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munity has accepted metropolitan desegregation. The community
has debated the changes in the method of student assignment result-
ing from the school board's efforts to reduce the extent of busing. 5
There is concern that particular schools are "out of compliance with
the guidelines." However, all the schools remain racially integrated,
and the maintenance of racial integration is a "given" in any propo-
sal for change. The prevailing attitude is perhaps best summed up in
a 1980 editorial in the Louisville Times, when the desegregation
plan had been in effect for five years: "This is an invitation to Presi-
dent-elect Reagan to inspect the Jefferson County schools as soon as
possible. They give lie to his glib pronouncement that 'busing has
been a failure.' In what way? Educationally? Not in Jefferson
County."6 In Louisville-Jefferson County today, black and white
children go to school together, which is, as Justice Marshall con-
tended in Milliken, "in the final analysis, what desegregation of the
public schools is all about."6 7
Since I now live in the Detroit metropolitan area, it should not
be surprising that I would wonder what things would be like here
today if Milliken had been decided differently, and if a metropolitan
desegregation plan had gone into effect here in 1975, as it did in
Louisville-Jefferson County. I realize that comparisons are neces-
sarily quite speculative. Numerous persons that I have spoken to
about this matter have insisted: "Detroit is different from Louis-
ville," or, "It never would have worked in Detroit," or, "All the
whites that could have afforded to would have pulled their children
out of the public schools."
Perhaps this would have been so, but perhaps not. The same
basic factors that were present in Louisville-Jefferson County at
that time were also present in Detroit. The overall tri-county public
school population at the time of Milliken was 70% white and 30%
black, and all of the schools included in the desegregation plan
would have been predominantly white (and in many instances
predominantly middle class) schools. In 1975, the Detroit public
schools were not in a condition of social disorganization, and there is
no reason to believe that in general white parents would object to
their children being bused to schools in Detroit any more than white
parents in Jefferson County objected to their children being bused to
schools in Louisville. Particularly, this would be so if, as in Louis-
ville-Jefferson County, white students would have to be bused for
only two or three years, and if the secondary schools, at least, would
have very similar racial compositions regardless of their location. Ex-
65. It has been contended that the busing burden is being disproportionately
borne by black students.
66. Louisville Times, Nov. 20, 1980.
67. 418 U.S. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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trapolating from the Louisville-Jefferson County experience, it is at
least arguable that there would not have been substantial white
flight from the public schools in the Detroit metropolitan area, and
that the public schools here would remain racially integrated today.
If metropolitan desegregation had occurred, it is also highly un-
likely that the Detroit public schools would be experiencing the con-
dition of social disorganization that they are experiencing today.
Stated simply, there would not be "Detroit public schools" as we
know them. There would not be, as there are today in Detroit,
schools populated almost entirely by low and moderate income chil-
dren, many of whom fall further behind in academic achievement
with each additional year of schooling they receive. In this circum-
stance, it should not be surprising that "the streets have carried over
into the schools," and that the "culture of poverty" sets the norm for
the school setting. If all the schools in the Detroit metropolitan area
had been desegregated in 1975, the schools in Detroit, like the
schools in the rest of the metropolitan area, would reflect the socio-
economic composition of the entire area, and would not be attended
predominantly by economically disadvantaged children. Not only
would the condition of social disorganization likely be absent, but
extrapolating from the Louisville-Jefferson County experience and
the experience elsewhere, we would also expect to see improved ag-
gregate levels of academic achievement on the part of the children
now attending the Detroit schools.
Finally, metropolitan desegregation might have had some influ-
ence on the demographics of the Detroit metropolitan area. Middle
class white families with school age children would not be deterred
from moving into the City of Detroit, because such a choice would
not necessarily mean that they have opted for private schools. In-
deed, their children would "stay in place," and would not have to be
bused for desegregation purposes.68 So too, middle class black fami-
lies, tired of sending their children to private schools, would not have
to move to the suburbs for "good" public schools, as some are now
doing. In short, housing choices would not be largely determined for
families with school age children by school considerations, as they
often are now. Ideally people could have chosen to live in the City of
Detroit and still have their children attend "good" public schools in
the Detroit metropolitan area.
This is not what happened, and as far as the public schools in
the Detroit metropolitan area are concerned, Justice Marshall's
68. In Louisville-Jefferson County, the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights had some success in promoting housing integration by "publicizing the
school attendance zones that families could move into to keep their children from
being bused, since children moving into opposite race neighborhoods were excluded
from busing." Rossell & Hawley, supra note 46, at 177.
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prophecy in his Milliken dissent has proven to be strikingly correct.
The effect of the Milliken decision in Detroit has indeed been "to
allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two
cities--one white, the other black." 9
69. 418 U.S. at 815 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This article ends on a note of
despair. The Detroit school system is a school system for the black urban under-
class, characterized by low levels of academic achievement, a very high dropout
rate, and social disorganization in the schools. Solutions to the overwhelming
problems of the Detroit school system today are complex and would require a de-
gree of commitment and sacrifice from all segments of the Detroit metropolitan
community that simply cannot be found. If Milliken had been decided differently,
the history of the Detroit metropolitan area might have turned out to be very differ-
ent as well.
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